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Normally everthing goes well in our world. But at night 
when we are sleeping, sometimes things go wrong. Army 
ants invade the camp; leopards may come in and steal a 
hunting dog or even a child. If we were awake these things 
would not happen. So when something big goes wrong, like 
illness or bad hunting or death, it must be because the 
forest is sleeping and not looking after its children. So what 
do we do? We wake it up. We wake it up by singing to it, 
and we do this because we want to awaken happy. Then 
everything will be well and good again. 
Colin Turnbull, The Forest People 
Solving Social Crises 
by Commissions 
''The report of the Commissionels," said 
Washington in his sixth address to Congress, 1'·"marks their 
firmness and abilities and must unite all virtuous men." The 
first commission to deal with a social crisis in America had 
recommended that the President send troops into western 
Pennsylvania to end the Whiskey Rebellion. As a cartoon of 
the day put it, sending 15,000 troops into the Allegheny 
and Monongahela River valleys against a few farmers for the 
collection of such a small tax was like swatting flies with a 
meat axe. 2 But social order was at stake; and that 
commission, like the.scores of crisis commissions which 
were to follow it, provided the chief executive with a 
strategy for restoring the commonweal while assuring the 
public that the problem could, in fact, be handled. 
Robert B Reich 
Whenever this nation experiences the kind of 
social crisis that challenges the capacity of its institutions to 
handle disorder, a commission of distinguished citizens is 
asked to probe the causes of the crisis and recommend 
solutions. In the wake.of seventy bombings across the 
nation, three attempted and two successful political 
assassinations, and fourteen riots all between i 910 and 
1913, 3 President Taft's Commission on Industrial Relations 
launched a "searching inquiry" 4 into the causes of labor 
unrest. '1'he nine members of the Commission," wrote 
Walter Lippman on the eve before their final report was 
issued, "have before them the awesome task of explaining 
why America, supposed to become the land of promise, has 
become a land of disappointment and deepseated discon-
tent." 5 After having questioned seven hundred witnesses, 
taken six and one half million words of testimony, traveled 
1 Washington Papers, sixth address to 
Congress, March 1 7, 1796. 
2 The Commentator, April 12, 1796 at 
3, col. 2. 
.3 See G. Adams, Jr., The Age of 
Industrial Violence, ch. 1, (1966). 
4 February 12, 1972, Cong. Rec. 62d 
Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 48, part 2, at 
1661. 
S Llppman, The Great Conquest, 30 
Everybody's Magazine 502 (April, 
1914). 
6 See 104 Outlook 492 (July 5, 1913). 
7 Final Rept, Sen. Doc. No, 415, 64th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Serial no 6929, at 2! 
8 N.Y. Times, April 23, 1929, at 3, coL 
1. 
9 National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, Final 
Report, at 13, 57, 59, 74, 101 (1931 
10 133 N. Y. World 99 (1931). 
11 National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, Final 
Report, at 88 (1931). 
12 Id at 121. 
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to fifteen cities where violence had erupted, and contem-
plated surveys and reports from fifteen social scientists,6 
the Commission issued its report. "We find the major cause 
of industrial unrest to be unemployment," they wrote. "We 
recommend further prosecution of monopolists under 
existing law." 7 Lippman's "awesome task" seemed 
strangely unfulfilled. 
Fifteen years later, the "noble experiment" 
embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment seemed in danger 
of collapse; the flouting of prohibition brought into 
question the whole system of law enforcement. In his 
inaugural address President Hoover ·promised "the widest 
inquiry into the shortcomings of the administration of 
justice and into the causes and remedies for them." 8 
Headed by former Attorney General George Wickersham, 
the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement produced eleven volumes of interviews, 
, surveys, statistics, and opinions, all tending to show that 
'police were often insensitive, brutal, and corrupt; that 
defendants were rarely accorded a fair trial; that prisons 
were inhumane; and that prohibition was unenforceable.9 
But the Commission made few recommendations for 
change. "Seriously and solemnly they reported that 
conditions were very bad," mused the N.Y. World, "and 
then recommended nothing to be done about it." 10 
Prohibition was probably unenforceable, the Commission 
concluded, but should remain on the statute books. 11 And 
although police disregarded the law, "the remedy for abuses 
of this sort involves the serious difficulty of altering rooted 
habits." 12 
Nine major crisis commissions have probed 
America's conscience since 1963, five of them appointed by 
Presidents, two appointed jointly by President and 
Congress, one by a governor, and one by the chief judge of 
a state court: the Warren Commission on the assassination 
of President Kennedy, 13 the McCon~ Commission on the 
Watts riots of 1965, 14 the Katzenbach Crime Commission 
on the "law and order" crisis that dominated political 
rhetoric in 1967, 15 the Kerner Commission on the ghetto 
riots of 1967 and 1968, 16 the Eisenhower Commission on 
the causes and prevention of violence in 1969, 17 the 
Scranton Commission on the campus uprisings of 1970, 18 
the Lockhart Commission on obscenity and pornography in 
1970, 19 the Shafer Commission on marijuana and drug 
abuse in 1972,20 and the McKay Commission on the Attica 
revolt of 1972. 21 These commissions assured America that 
ghetto rioting, crime, campus violence, obscenity, drugs, 
and prison rioting could be handled if the American people 
had the "will" to handle them. "America will prevail," the 
Eisenhower Violence Commission summed up its report. 
"It has absorbed millions of immigrants and given them 
freedom to develop in their own manner-to chase an 
honest buck, build, aim at the moon, build a bomb, and 
dream their dreams." 22 But the commissions were 
reluctant to hold specific institutions or individuals 
responsible for the crises which they explored, and their 
recommendations for change comprised a curious mixture 
of vagueness and homily. Few if any of their recommen-
dations were actually followed. 
The American crisis commission is unique 
among the citizen task forces, special conferences, study 
groups, advisory groups, and planning commissions that 
surround our more formal institutions of government. All 
of these groups are temporary; all avempt to "involve" 
private citizens who otherwise have ~ull time occupations 
and who rarely get paid for t_heir government efforts. But 
unlike the perennial conferences on aging, children and 
youth, or health, crisis commissions do not generally 
attempt to mobilize special interest groups behind specific 
pieces of upcoming legislation; unlike planning commissions 
such as the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive 
Branch or the U.S. Commission on Reform of the Federal · 
Criminal Code, crisis commissions do not generally attempt 
to devise legislation or plan specific programs. Crisis 
commissions are triggered by particular social crises, and 
their attention is focussed on discovering why the crises 
occurred and how they can be avoided in the future. 
In their pursuit of "cause," crisis commissions 
resemble grand juries and Congressional investigating 
committees. They are often given the power to subpoena 
witnesses and compel disclosure of information; their 
reports, transcripts, and evidence are often reviewed by 
courts which have jurisdiction over grand jury investigations 
being conducted simultaneously with the commission's 
investigation. 
13 United States Commission to 
Investigate the Assassination of 
President Kennedy (19) hereinafter 
cited as Warren Commission. 
16 National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, Report (1968) hereinafter 
cited as Kerner Commission. 
19 National Commission on Ubscemty 
and Pornography, Report (1970) 
hereinafter cited as Lockhart 
Commission. 
14 Governor's Commission on the Los 
Angeles Riots of 1965, Violence in the 
City-an End or a Beginning? (1965) 
hereinafter cited as McCone Com-
mission. 
15 President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration 
of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society (1967) hereinafter cited 
as Katzenbach Commission; Task 
Force Reports, hereinafter cited as 
Katzenbach Task Force on-. 
17 National Commission on the Causes 
and Prevention of Violence, To 
Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic 
Tranquility (1969) hereinafter cited as 
Eisenhower Commission; Numerous 
Study Group Reports, which will be 
cited by name. 
18 President's Commission on Campus 
Unrest, Report (1970) hereinafter 
cited as Scranton Commission. 
20 National Commission on Marihuana 
and Drug Abuse, Marihuana: A Signal 
of Misunderstanding (1972) hereinafter 
cited as Shafer Commission. 
21 New York State Special Commission 
on Attica, Report (1972) hereinafter 
cited as McKay Commission. 
22 Eisenhower Commission at 261. 
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Yet, unlike grand juries, crisis commissions are 
not required to proceed in secrecy, they are not required to 
warn defendants "marked" for prosecution of their Fifth 
Amendment rights, and they are generally immune from 
challenges that their members have been selected according 
to arbitrary or biased standards. 23 On the other hand, if 
crisis commissions go beyond their investigative role and 
make specific findings of guilt, they are held to an even 
higher standard of due process than are grand juries. 24 
Crisis commissions also resemble legislative 
investigating committees, such as the Kefauver Special 
Committee to investigate organized crime or the infamous 
McCarthy Subcommittee on Investigations. Many crisis 
commissions, in fact, are created by legislative fiat, and a 
few legislators are normally appointed to the commissions. 
In 1909, angered by Theodore Roosevelt's rather loose and 
cavalier use of commissions, Congress prohibited the use of 
public funds for any commission that it had not specifically 
authorized. 25 New York State's Moreland Act of 1907 26 
treats that state's chief executive much more generously, 
granting him the power to appoint commissions, subpeona 
and enforce the attendance of witnesses, and pay all the 
expenses directly out of the state treasury. 
But for all their involvement with legislatures, 
crisis commissions have an important symbolic role "above 
politics." They are comprised for the most part of private 
citizens and, unlike legislative committees, they possess 
large, gangling staffs of lawyers, social scientists, and 
consultants. 
The real function of crisis commissions in 
American life places them far away from any other 
government institution. They are as significant for what 
they fail to accomplish as for what they do accomplish. 
Crisis commissions have a cultural function which can be 
understood only by looking at them as a single phenom-
enon. The purpose here is not to condemn any individual 
commission, for in their specifics crisis commissions vary a 
great deal. Nor is it the purpose of this article to suggest 
specific reforms that might be undertaken to make crisis 
commissions "work" more effectively. Rather, what is 
attempted here is to draw more general connections, a.nd to 
show the significance of crisis commissions in American 
culture. Such an inquiry, looking back over the crisis 
commissions of the last decades from a vantage point deep 
within the social bog of Nixon's second term, is an ironic 
and revealing exercise. It illuminates a great deal about how 
social crisis is perceived in this country, and about the role 
of ritual in America. 
e Everyone knows that little or no relationship 
exists between what crisis commissions recommend and 
what politicians actually do. When politicians are interested 
in taking action, they do not resort to crisis commissions. 
Nixon justified his deus ex machina intervention in the 
Calley case by contending that the matter was just "too 
important to pass the buck to another commission." 27 
Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed no crisis commissions 
during his crisis-filled tenure of office, and Lyndon Johnson 
resorted to crisis commissions only during his last two years 
of office, after the Great Society had bogged down in 
Southeast Asia. Some of the most harrowing social crises of 
this nations's history were never studied by crisis commis-
sions. Lincoln, presumably, never felt called upon to 
appoint a commission on slavery; Lyndon Johnson never 
even replied to Robert Kennedy's proposal that he be 
appointed chairman of a Presidential Commission to Study 
and Evaluate the Conduct of the Vietnam War. 28 It seems 
doubtful, at this writing, that Richard Nixon will appoint a 
Watergate Commission. 
For politicians unwilling or unable to take 
political action, however, crisis commissions are ideal 
vehicles for keeping the public occupied and content that 
the social crisis is being "handled." During Herbert 
Hoover's phlegmatic administration he appointed no less 
that ninety-four separate commissions, of which forty-eight 
can easily be classified as the crisis variety. 29 His Commis-
sion on Economic Trends, for example, convened in the 
wake of l 929's rather uninspired economic trend, studied 
the situation for six months and then reported that the 
"tempo" of industry and commerce had changed. 30 
Similarly, in 1967, when news broke of the CIA's role in 
the National Student Association and other private groups, 
Johnson appointed a special commission to investigate and 
recommend action. The commission had three meetings and 
never reported its findings. 31 
The appointment of a crisis commission also 
provides he chief executive with an ideal means of taking 
the wind out of impending legislation. Taft's Commission 
on Industrial Relations forestalled some liberal programs 
then brewing in Congress. 32 The Katzenbach Crime 
Commission was created, according to its chairman, as a 
way of delaying a ground swell movement in Congress for 
"law and order" legislation. 33 The Kerner Commission was 
also a defensive reaction, buying timeJor the adminis-
23 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 203 N.E. 
2d 399, 401 (Ill., 1965) (secrecy); U.S. 
v. Scully 225 F. 2d 113 (2d Cir., 1955) 
(protection of Fifth Amendment 
rights); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
(1950) (representative grand jury). 
24 See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche 363 U.S. 
420 (1960). In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 411 (1969), the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional a 
Louisiana statute creating a Civil 
Rights Commission for the state, 
claiming that the Commission was 
adjudicating criminal culpability 
without providing adequate due 
process safeguards. The Court held the 
Commission to a higher standard than 
grand juries, reasoning that 
investigative bodies such as the 
commission have no claim to specific 
Constitutional sanction ... And the 
Commission is in no sense an 
independent body of citizens. Rather, 
its members serve at the pleasure of the 
Governor. 395 U.S. at 430. 
26 N.Y.L ch 539 as amended by ch 131. 
27 N.Y. Times, April 14, 1971 at 2, col. 4. 
28 See Drew, On Giving Oneself a 
Hotfoot: Government by Commission,. 
221 Atlantic 45 (May, 1968). 
29 W. Myers and W. Newton, The Hoover 
Administration, at 492 (1936). Thus it seems doubtful whether the 
Warren Commission-surely going 
beyond a mere investigating role-
could have subpeonaed Marina 
Oswald had her husband still been alive 
when the investigation was being 
carried out. 
25 Sundry Civil Act, amend· 
ment-U.S.C.-. 
30 President's Commission on Economic 
Trends, Final Report, 12 (1929). 
31 See Drew, supra note 30. 
32 See Adams, supra note 3, at 34-38. 
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tration to work out new strategies in the wake of the 1967 
riots. And according to several commentators, 34 the 
Lockhart obscenity and pornography commission was little 
more than an attempt to head off the "anti-smut" 
campaign then raging in Congress. 35 
Once a crisis commission has issued its report, a 
chief executive can use it, abuse it, or ignore it with 
impunity. The temporary life of crisis commissions make 
them particularly vulnerable to political whim. Crisis 
commissioners do not remain commissioners after their 
reports are issued. They go back to their normal occupa-
tions, their staff disperses, and their funds dissipate. Thus 
commissions can not easily reply to political attack, nor can 
they descry political indifference. They possess no ready 
constituency to carry on their banner, no powerful interest 
group with a continuing stake in their proposals. In short, 
crisis commissions have no political clout. 
To steal the limelight and possess no political 
clout invites trouble in a Washington starved for whipping 
. boys. The three most recent crisis commissions were hung 
in effigy high above the White House, to the certain 
political advantage of its occupants. Vice President Agnew 
accused the Scranton Commission on campus unrest of 
supplying "mere pablum for the permissivists." 36 The 
Commission assumed a position of neutrality, he said, 
"between the fireman and the arsonist." 37 Instead of 
responding directly to the report, President Nixon delivered 
a major speech the same week the report was issued, 
assailing college faculties who bowed to student demands, 
and asking Congress for an additional one thousand FBI 
agents to prowl the nation's campuses. 38 . 
· The Lockhart Commission on obscenity and 
pornography fared worse. An ominous warning came two 
days before the release of the Commission's report when 
Postmaster General Winton Blout asserted that "this 
administration is simply not going to legalize pornography. 
Under cover of the First Amendment the dirt merchants 
have erected a multimillion dollar empire dedicated to 
human degredation." 39 Attorney General John Mitchell 
was quick to point out that "The Commission is not 
connected with the Nixon administration." 40 Meanwhile, 
presidential speechwriter Patrick Buchanan was assigned to 
help write the dissenting report of Commissioner Charles 
Keating, the lone Nixon appointee to the Commission. 41 
The Vice President, on the same day that the report was 
issued, demanded that laws be passed "to restrain bad taste 
and outrageous vulgarity." 42 The President did not respond 
to the report. 
The President did reply personally to one 
recent Commission study. "I am in disagreement," he said 
after reading the Shafer Commission's report on marijuana. 
"Reading it did not change my mind. I oppose the 
legalization of marijuana; and that includes its sale, its 
possession, and its use. That is my position, despite what 
the Commission has recommended." 43 
Commission reports normally prompt less 
political action than rhetoric. By the time the reports are 
issued, much of the public concern and legislative 
momentum that existed when the commissions began 
operating has been lost. Commission recommendations 
usually fall on politically deaf ears. One former commis-
sioner remembers that "there was a great ceremony with 
plaudits in the Rose Garden when our appointment was 
announced, and then at the end we couldn't find anyone to 
hand the damn report to." 44 In testimony before a Senate 
subcommittee investigating Presidential Commissions, 45 
Chairmen Katzenbach, Kerner, and Milton Eisenhower all 
stated that their reports had resulted in little or no political 
action. 46 Two follow-up studies, one conducted a year 
after the Kerner Commission reported, and the other 
conducted two years after, 47 both concluded that almost no 
progress had been made on any of the Commission's 
recommendations. 411 
When read together, the decades of crisis 
reports contain a kind of repeating cadence: the same 
findings, the same recommendations, the same tones of 
righteous indignation and moral exhortation. "It is a kind 
of Alice in Wonderland," noted Kenneth Clark, veteran of 
; several crisis commissions, "with the same moving picture 
·shown over and over again ... and the same inaction." 49 
The reports of the Commissions themselves reveal an ironic 
awareness that their words often substitute for political 
action. The quote from Kenneth Clark appears in the 
introduction to the Kerner Commission report, as a kind of 
apologia. The McKay Attica commission prefaced its report 
by asserting that "the need is not for more statements but 
for more action." 50 
33 Statement of.Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach, May 26, 1971, Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess 
hereinafter cited as Hearings. 
39 N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1970, at 11, col. 
1. 
46 Id. 
47 National Urban Coalition, One Year 
Later (1969); The Kerner Report 
Revisited (P. Meranto, ed. 1970). 
48 Id. One Year Later at 2-6;Kerner 
34 211 The Nation 132 (August 31, 
1970). 
35 Id. 
36 N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1970 at 1, col. 1. 
37 Id. 
38 N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1970 at 1, col. 1. 
. 40 N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1970 at 61, col. 
6. 
41 N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, sec. IV, at 
5,col. 1. 
42 N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, l970, at 1, col. 
43 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1972, at 
12, col. 5. 
44 Cited by Drew, supra note 30. 
45 Hearings, at May 25, 1970, May 26, 
1970, and June 22, 1970. 
Revisited at 5. 
49 Kerner Commission at 29. 
SO McKay Commission at xiii. 
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Old recommendations seem strangely modern. 
The 1931 Wickersham Commission's report on law 
observance and enforcement, for example, is a contempo· 
rary document, sharing much of the language and sentiment 
of the Katzenbach Crime Commission which issued its own 
report thirty six years after the Wickersham report. Both 
reports call for an inventory of the cost of crime, 51 both 
speak of the need for centralized crime statistics 52 and 
centralized state prosecution systems, 53 both recommend 
more education and training for police, 54 and the 
recruitment of minorities into the forces. 55 Both reports 
note the tragic failure of prisons, 56 and both document the 
need to strengthen probation and parole services. 57 Both 
recommend community-based corrections, 58 and dwell on 
the necessity for making more visible and uniform the 
many discretionary aspects of arrest and prosecution. 59 
·Both reports express outrage that most offenders are held 
for months awaiting final disposition of their cases, and 
that few of them ever have a full trial. 60 The Wickersham 
report, now more than forty years old, resounds with 
phrases which are familiar. ''The prison system is anti-
quated and inefficient," it warned. "It does not reform the 
criminal and it fails to protect society." 61 
But no more than three years after being issued, 
the Wickersham report vanished. In 1934, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt convoked six hundred state judges, prosecutors, 
and police officials to discuss the federal role in state and 
local enforcement efforts; but in neither the meetings, nor 
in the policies which grew out of the meetings, was the 
Wickersham report even mentioned. 62 Only once, after the 
conference had adjourned, did the President of the A.B.A. 
note how unfortunate it was that "the Wickersham report, 
which made one of the most thorough investigations of law 
observance and enforcement in our time, now gathers dust 
on the shelves of college libraries." 63 
Crisis commissions also have an uncanny way of 
predicting issues. Their somber warnings of what will occur 
if their recommendations are not adopted often come -true. 
The 1919 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, for 
example, traced the causes of rioting in that city to the 
exclusion ofnegroes from "financial power," the difficulty 
of their fmdinA decent housing, and discrimination in 
employment. The Commission warned that unless these 
causes were remedied, more violence would occur in future 
years. 65 The Scranton Commission on campus unrest 
warned two years before the killings at Southern State 
University that "sending civil authorities onto a college· 
campus armed as if for war-armed to kill-has brought 
tragedy in the past; if this practice is not changed, tragedy 
will come again. 66 And a presidential commission on the 
status of women warned in its 1963 report of serious social 
dislocation and discontent unless women of America began 
to receive equal pay with men, equal legal rights to 
contract, convey, and own property, and equal opportunity 
in hiring, job training, and promotion. 67 The report also 
recommended paid maternity leave and subsidized child 
care services. 68 
The obvious inability of crisis commissicfus to 
promote political change has led many to call for their 
abolition. After having served on the Eisenhower Violence 
Commission, Judge Leon Higginbotham called for a 
"national moratorium on any temporary study commis-
sions to probe the causes of racism, or poverty, or crime, or 
social crisis." 69 Columnist Carl Rowan argues that 
commission reports simply "add to the pool of social 
bitterness and despair" whenever they arouse hopes of 
action that those in power really have no intention of 
carrying out. 'lO 
And yet, over and above their short-lived utility 
to politicians there is something in American culture that 
expects and demands crisis commissions. The ritualized 
convocation of prestigous citizens to "probe the causes" of 
social crisis can not be explained by political expedience 
alone. The shock of Attica touched a deep nerve in 
America, as did the widespread use of marijuana, the 
campus strikes, the outbreak of pornography, ghetto 
rioting, the flouting of prohibition, and labor unrest. 
America sought explanations for such disorder. More than 
that, it sought the reassurance which politicians could not 
give it. The "blue ribbon" panels of private citizens, the 
well-publicized hearings, and the voluminous reports which 
followed, provided this kind of reassurance. 
The substance of the reassurance is that the 
social crisis can be understood and that a solution is 
available for it. The reports of the crisis commissions which 
have appeared in the last decade, in thick paperback 
editions, packed with awesome statistics, powerful 
exhortations, and simple recommendations for action, 
provided America with tangible evidence that disorder was 
comprehensible. The crisis commissions supplied answers 
which could make "sense" out of the social crises without 
51 Wickersham Report on the Costs of 
Crime 49-53; Task Force Report Cost 
of Crime 42-59. 
52 Wickersham Report on Criminal 
Statistics 5-18; Task Force Report on 
Cost of Crime 123-237. 
56 Wickersham Report on Penal 
Institutions 170-174; Task Force 
Report on the Prisons 159-187. 
57 Id. 
62 Proc. of the A tt Gen's Conference of 
Crime, 3-8, 17-20, 456 (1935). 
63 Id. at 198. 
64 The Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A 
Study of Race Relations and a Race 
Riot (1922) at 220, 229. 53 Wickersham Report on Prosecution 
37-38; Katzenbach Commission 
147-149. 
54 Wickersham Report on the Police 1-10; 
Katzenbach Commission 91-125. 
SS Id. 
58 id. 
59 Wickersham Report on Prosecution 
6-29; Katzenbach Commission 
130-131. 
60 Wickersham Report on Prosecution 
59-73; Task Force on the Courts 4-t3. 
61 Wickerhsam Report on Penal 
Institutions at 173. 
65 Id. at 35-39. 
66 Scranton Commission at 149. 
67 President's Commission on the Status 
of Women, Report, (1963) at 3, 8, 14, 
15, 27. 
68 Id. at 33, 39. 
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altering old patterns of perception. For the real threat that 
these crises posed was not so much an immediate threat to 
the nation's order, but a far deeper threat to the nation's 
way of viewing itself. It was this larger threat with which 
the crisis commissions dealt. Crisis commissions rationalize 
crisis within old familiar frameworks. In so doing, they 
bring crisis under control. 
Colin Turnbull, in The Forest People, 71 
describes the ritual of the "molimo" employed by pigmies 
of central Africa when a crisis such as illness, bad hunting, 
or death has affected the tribe. The "molimo" expiates the 
evil and reaffirms the peaceful relationship between the 
tribe and their forest. It is a ritual of purification which is 
at the same time a celebration of everything the forest has 
given to them in times past. Atonement and reaffirmation 
are entwined within the "molimo" festival, which continues 
for several weeks. During the festival, all the normal 
activities and routines of the tribe are suspended. The 
sound of the molimo trumpet, blown by a special member 
of the tribe, symbolizes the forest calling to its people, and 
the pigmies sing in response. The festival ends in a dance, 
led by the oldest and most venerable members of the tribe, 
and joined in by the youngest members. 
The festival of the "mo limo" restores order to 
the tribe by making the evil comprehensible. It is related to 
our own ritual of rationalizing social crisis. For the crisis 
commission also performs a symbolic purification and 
reaffirmation, and it contains its own carefully measured 
cadence. The analogy between the two rituals provides a 
framework for understanding the one in which we 
periodically take part. 
Crisis commissions are convoked to probe and 
explain the kinds of disorder which are the most difficult 
for America to understand. Unrelated acts of lawlessness 
will always occur; indeed, they are expected. Explanations 
for them are left to the normal processes of criminal justice, 
and the deeper explanations for them are left to academics. 
The lawlessness of agents of law enforcement, while not to 
be condoned, is understandable to an America whose 
armies and mythic frontier sheriffs enforce the peace with 
brute force. The process by which laws which are widely 
violated are created in the first place belongs to a nether-
world called politics which is perfectly understandable to 
America. 
But the widespread disorder produced by labor 
in 1913, drinkers of alcoholic beverages in 1929, and ghetto 
blacks, students, pornography dealers, marijuana smokers, 
and prisoners during the past decade, cries out for 
explanation. These can not be understood as parts of the 
normal processes of disorder that accompany law breaking, 
law enforcing, and law making. Their scale is too large to 
invoke grand juries, prosecutors, judges, and academics. 
Disorder is not only widespread, but it is also dangerously 
close and highly visible. Rather than being carried on by 
social outcasts who can be labeled "deviant," the lawless-
ness comes from groups more central to American culture: 
laborers, youth, students, blacks, drinkers. Because of this, 
individual guilt no longer seems relevant. The question of 
who is responsible becomes more problematic. Widespread, 
extraordinary lawlessness undermines the normal way 
responsibility is attributed to those who act. It suggests 
deeper causes, and it implicates all the social institutions 
which surround the lawlessness. 
As a result, the advent of social crisis of this 
sort normally suspends criminal procedures pending the 
outcome of the quest for the "real cause" of the crisis. 
Actions that would have brought about criminal prosecu-
This was a time to get back to the forest as 
quickly as possible an.d to hold the biggest 
molimo festival the forest had ever seen, to 
make the forest happy again. 72 
- tion had they occurred in normal circumstances now 
become single bits of evidence of the "real cause" and mere 
symptoms of the forces which lie behind them. For 
Crisis commissions are convoked to explain 
only certain kinds of social disorder. They are not called 
into being by individual, unrelated acts of lawlessness which 
occur every day in America. Nor are crisis commissions 
created primarily because of the lawlessness of agents of 
law enforcement, such as the state troopers who killed 
forty three men at Attica, the national guardsmen who 
killed four students at Kent State, or the Mississippi 
Highway Partolmen who killed two students at Jackson 
State College. Nor, finally, are crisis commissions convened 
; solely because the laws which are widely violated are 
themselves suspect, such as laws prohibiting alcoholic 
beverages, marijuana, or pornography. 
1 example, in the wake oflarge scale labor violence in 1913, 
the Commission on Industrial Relations forestalled many 
criminal prosecutions, despite the opinion of the editors .of 
the New York World who insisted that "Labor leaders 
should have appeared before a grand jury. A crime is a 
crime, and those who breach and practice it should be 
addressed, not by professors of econoniics, but by the 
police, jury, and judge." 73 
69 Eisenhower Commission at 119. 
70 211 The Nation 132 (August 31, 
1970). 
71 C. Turnbull, The Forest People (1962). 
72 Id. at 50. 
73 N. Y. World, May 22, 1914 at 15, col. 
3. 
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The pursuit of the "real cause" calls into 
question every institution in American life. Disorder is felt 
to be a contagion whose roots might be anywhere and 
everywhere. The flouting of prohibition prompted Hoover 
to call for "the widest inquiry into the shortcomings of the 
administration of justice and the observance of law in 
American society." 74 Johnson's mandate to the Eisen-
hower Violence Commission ordered "a penetrating search 
for the causes of violence-into our national life, our past as 
well as our present, our traditions as well as our hopes, our 
cul tu re, our customs, and our laws." 75 
Such a penetrating search cannot be carried on 
through the normal channels of politics. Bargaining to 
consensus between special interests may be tolerable for 
arriving at workable programs, but is totally niappropriate 
for discovering the truth. Moreover, political institutions 
are as tainted with responsibility for the crisis as any other 
institutions. "The matter is far far too important for 
politics," said Johnson in appointing the Kerner Commis-
sion. "It goes to the health and safety of all American 
citizens-Republicans and Democrats." 76 
What is needed is an impartial tribunal, above 
politics, to carry out the investigation. Something major has 
gone awry, and what is sought is a parent who can set it 
right again. The most outstanding example of such a 
tribunal is the British royal commission. 
For almost a thousand years the British royal 
commission has functioned as a supra-political and 
supra-legal institution. It is the conscience of Britain, 
forever restoring credibility to other British institutions and 
pointing out what should be done. As a distinctly royal 
body, convoked by the monarch, it is separate from 
Parliament. At various times in British history if has, in 
fact, been a vehicle for royal ascendancy over Parliament. 77 
Although the history of the British royal 
commission extends back to 1080 when William I sent out 
a royal commission to compile the Domesday Book, the 
golden age of the royal commission did not arrive until the 
mid-nineteenth century. It was the Age of Victoria. ''The 
history of British democracy," wrote Felix Frankfurter, 
"might in considerable measure be written in terms of the 
history of successive royal commissions." 78 During a span 
of forty years, successive royal commissions shepherded a 
social revolution. There was a commission on the Poor 
Laws, on children in factories, on the Irish poor, on 
military punishment, on children in mines, on penal 
servitude and capital punishment, on trade unions, on labor 
laws, on women and children in agriculture, on mining 
accidents, on reformatories, and on housing. The commis-
sions recommended and sought passage of legislation that 
profoundly enlarged the range of social problems for which 
government took responsibility. 79 
That the British royal commission is "above 
politics" is a fact understood even by politicians. Regardless 
of who is in power when the report of the commission is 
issued, the commission's "blue paper" is formally 
responded to by a cabinet "white paper" which outlilles in 
detail the Government's views on the report and the 
Government's proposals for implementing the commission's 
recommendations. For example, the 1929 Royal Commis-
sion on Police Powers and Procedures recommended 
changes in the administration of justice that would expand 
the rights of the accused and decriminalize several types of 
gambling. Although within two months of the Commis-
sion's report the Conservative Government was replaced by 
Ramsay MacDonald's first Labour Government, a "white 
paper" was duly issued by the Labour Government, and 
within six months many of the recommendations had been 
instituted. 80 
A more telling example is the recent Royal 
Commission on Local Government which filed its report in 
late 1969, s!X months before Prime Minister Heath took the 
reigns. 81 · The Commission recommended that all large cities 
in Britain employ the London model of a single urban area 
council with neighborhood and borough units-a radical 
overhaul of government that would undoubtedly-trample 
upon many vested political interests. Its recommendations 
were closely analogous to those made by the Eisenhower 
Violence Commission for the organization of cities in this. 
country. 82 But unlike the stony silence which received the 
Eisenhower Commission's recommendations, Heath's 1970 
"white paper" on local government incorporated essentially 
all of the royal commissions' proposals, and the Govern-
ment is actively pursuing them at this time. 83 
If royal commissions are so effective in Britain, 
why are they so ineffective here? If the royal commission is 
the model of authority to which America looks in times of 
social crisis, why hasn't the model been adopted in its 
entirety, as a vehicle for genuine political change? 
According to Franklin D. Roosevelt, the reason was simple. 
"The royal commission makes its report to Parliament and 
the thing goes through almost automatically, without fuss 
or feathers. But in the United States, we lack the proper 
temperament." 84 
74 72 Cong. Rec. 21, 27 (1929). 
75 Eisenhower Commission i, ii. 
76 Kerner Commission xvi. 
80 See Hanser, Guide to LJecision: 'J'he 
British Royal Commission at 148 
(1965). 
77 See T. Lockwood, A History of Royal 
Commissions, 5 Osgoode Hall L. J. 172 
(1967). 
78 F. Frankfurter, The Public and its 
·Government at 162 (1930). 
79 C. Carr, Concerning English Adminis-
trative Law at 3-4 (l 94 l). 
81 See Hearings, May 26, 1971. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Press Conference April 21, 1938, in 
Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 1938, at 
288 (1949). 
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Roosevelt's analysis misses the point. The 
difference between the British royal commission 
and the American crisis commission is more than a 
mere matter of temperament. The real difference lies in 
their very different functions. The British royal commission 
does not try to explain social crisis. It is not called upon to 
place blame or responsibility. It does not perform a public 
function of reaffirmation. The British royal commission is 
essentially a planning body, called into operation after the 
political organs of government have decided to take action. 
Its reports are designed to be used by politicians and they 
are issued without fanfare. The American crisis commission, 
on the contrary, has an important public function. It 
explains and reaffirms. 
• He went up to Ausu and took the molimo 
trumpet from him and gently filled the forest 
with strange sounds ... 85 
The quest for the "real cause" is a quest for the 
truth; but not simply any truth. It is a quest for a truth that 
can be understood without the necessity of altering other 
accepted truths, "We have arrived at a time in our history," 
Herbert Hoover pontificated at a news conference shortly 
before announcing the appointment of the Wickersham 
Commission, "when because of the increasing complexity 
of our civilization and the delicacy of its adjustments, we 
must make doubly certain that we discover the truth before 
we determine our policies." 86 The quest is for a simple 
answer that cuts through the complexities and ambiguities. 
"Find the truth," Johnson told the Kerner Commission. 
"Find the whole truth." 87 
Truth in America depends upon facts, upon 
hard data and lots of numbers. Regardless of whether or 
not a particular fact is relevant, it possesses a concreteness 
and a certainty that, when combined with thousands of 
other such facts, bestows authority and legitimacy. Crisis 
commissions are specially designed to collect facts. 
Hoover's Commission on Social Trends, for example, was 
, charged with "conducting an extensive survey into 
I significant social changes in our national life over recent 
years and to produce a body of systematic fact about social 
problems that will be of fundamental and permanent 
value." 88 The Commission report, when completed, ran to 
eight fat volumes, each of which resembled a small World 
Almanac. 
The fact-collecting efforts of crisis commissions 
are exhaustive. Instead of being content to interview a mere 
sampling of the individuals involved in a particular crisis, 
the commissions often interview nearly everyone who has 
had anything whate.ver to do with the event. The Kerner 
Commission conducted more than 1200 interviews in 
twenty three cities that had experienced rioting, collecting 
over 1500 pages of depositions. 89 The Walker Study Team 
of the Eisenhower Violence Commission based its report of 
the rioting at the 1968 Democratic National Convention on 
3,437 statements of eyewitnesses and participants, one 
hundred eighty hours of motion picture film, and 12,000 
still photographs. 90 The McKay Attica Commission 
interviewed 1600 of the 2243 inmates who were at Attica 
during the uprising (all of them would have been inter-
viewed but for the fact that many had already been released 
and could not be located). 91 Each Attica interview lasted 
an average of forty four minutes. The Commission also 
interviewed four hundred of the four hundred fifty 
correctional officers who were present on the day of the 
rioting, two hundred seventy of the approximately three 
hundred State Police who participated in or who had direct 
knowledge of the events, two hundred National Guardsmen 
who had firsthand knowledge, and almost all of the one 
hundred sheriffs, undersheriffs, and deputies who had been 
involved. 92 
Crisis commissions have documented the 
history of social movements, ethnic migrations, violence in 
America, political assassinations, marijuana use, collective 
disorder, and prisons in America. They have conducted 
extensive public opinion surveys on such diverse topics as 
why people use marijuana, 93 what people think should be 
the government's response to pornography, 94 and the 
extent to which people have altered their personal habits 
out of fear of violent crime. 95 
Often, fact collecting is carried on by public 
investigators. The Walker Study Team, for example, relied 
upon the FBI for more than two thirds of the eyewitness 
accounts on which it based its report, and also sought help 
from the U.S. Attorney's office in Chicago. 96 
85 Turnbull, supra note 73, at 75. 89 Kerner Commission at 574 et. seq. 
90 Rights in Conflict at xiii (1968). 
91 McKay Commission at xxviii. 
86 W. Myers, The State Papers and Other 
Public Writings of Herbert Hoover, vol. 
1, at 197 (1934). 
87 Kerner Commission, xvi. 
88 Myers, supra note 88, at 195. 
92 Id. at xxx-xxxiii. 
93 Shafer Commission at 68-73. 
94 Lockhart Commission at 187-88. 
95 Eisenhower Commission at 19. 
96 Rights in Conflict at xiii. 
8
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 3 [1973], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol3/iss3/3
262 
But the great bulk of fact collecting is normally 
carried on by small armies of interviewers, researchers, and 
consultants under the direct employ of the commissions. 
The Kerner, Scranton, and Attica Commissions each had in 
excess of one hundred full and part time staff assistants. 97 
Beyond these stretched myriads of consultants: academics, 
think-tank groups, experts hired to produce specific studies. 
The Kerner Commission, for example, awarded an $18,000 
contract to Trans Century Corporation, a Washington-based 
research group, for a study of employment trends; $45,000 
to Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Science 
Research for a study of the arrest records of rioters; 
$45,000 to a University of Michigan research group for an 
analysis of the life habits of rioters; $38,000 to the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police for a study on 
. police preparedness; and $10,000 to Systemetrics, a 
subsidiary of the Real Estate Research Corporation, for 
coordinating and summarizing all the other research 
projects. 98 Individual social scientists are hired for special 
research projects, and often carry out the work at their own 
universities. The Eisenhower Violence Commission assured 
all its social scientists that their work would be published in 
full, even if the Commission disagreed with its findings, as it 
did with Jerome Skolnick's Politics of Protest. 99 
Thus, crisis commissions orchestrate a large 
number of people who do nothing but collect facts. Many 
of them are professionals trained specifically to collect 
facts; if they were not collecting them for the commissions, 
they would be collecting them for government agencies or 
under government research grants. Facts are the foundation 
on which the commissions base themselves, and yet the 
business of collecting the facts is not the responsibility of 
the commissioners. As one disgruntled member of the 
Wickersham Commission put it, ''We do not vouch for 
anything in the report; it is all the work of hired ex-
perts." mo 
But facts alone are not enough. The facts must 
be applied in a scientific way in order to arrive at rational 
explanations. As Hoover told the Wickersham Commission, 
"After the facts are discovered and assembled in their true 
perspective, the conclusions to be drawn from them must 
be the inexorable march of logic." 101 Truth is as much a 
matter of science as it is of hard data; America's worship of 
one is firmly linked to its worship of the other. 
97 See Kerner Commission at vi, viii; 
Scranton Commission at xvii-xx; 
McKay Commission at v-vii. 
Rational explanations are discovered through 
induction, step by step backwards from the volumes of 
facts about what actually occurred, toward those initial 
events and conditions that are truly "responsible." The 
"inexorable march of logic" is thought to be objective and 
neutral. Thus, the broad social conditions that lay at the 
beginning of the casual chain are discussed in the bland, 
neutral terms of science. "Labor unrest," reasoned the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, "has as its funda-
mental cause the frustration of unemployment." 102 "rhe 
McCone Commission found the basic cause of the Watts 
riots to be "the resentment of blacks" which exists as a 
product of "past mistreatment in the South and present 
maladjustment in the North." 103 The Scranton Commis-
sion discovered student alienation as the fundamental cause 
of campus unrest. "Over time, more and more students 
have moved in the direction of an ever deeper and more 
inclusive sense of opposition to the larger society" 104 
Frustration, resentment, and alienation also lay at the heart 
of the Attica revolt: "Like the urban ghetto disturbances of 
the l 960's, the Attica uprising was the product of 
frustrated hopes and expectations." 105 
Frustration, resentment, alienation, and 
maladjustment seem to be neutral terms, but they are not. 
They emphasize the inability of the actors to come to terms 
with what are characterized as neutral or at least inevitable 
social conditions-unemployment, mistreatment, injustice, 
or thwarted expectations. Responsibility for social crisis 
seems to rest with those who have not been able to adjust. 
The obvious implication is that it is their fault for not 
adjusting. 
The commissions detail a universe in which no 
one seems to have any control. The reason for poverty is 
not some personal failing, but "the accident of being born 
to the wrong parents, or the lack of opportunity to become 
un-poor, or some other circumstance over which the 
individual has no control." 106 It is not the ghetto youth's 
fault that he is violent, according to the Eisenhower 
Violence Commission. He is violent "because loosely-
organized inner-city families make children subject to 
premature autonomy" resulting in "resentment of 
authority figures such as policemen and teachers." 107 The 
commissions exonerate the actors from blame while at the 
same time keeping responsibility focussed directly upon 
them. By not pursuing the inquiry further, by not shifting 
focus to discover why the ghetto family has become 
102 Commission on Industrial Relations, 
Report, supra note 7. 
98 As reported by Kopkind, White on 
Black: The Riot Commission and the 
Rhetoric of Reform, 44 Hard Times at 
1-4 (September 15, 1969). 
103 McCone Commission at 27-28. 
104 Scranton Commission at 58-59. 
105 McKay Commission at 105. 
106 President's Commission on Income 
Maintenance, Report (1967). 99 Hearings, May 26, 1971. 
100 As reported by L. Symes, The Great 
Fact-finding Farce, 1964 Harpers 354 
(1932). 
101 Hoover State Papers vol l, pp 362-364, 
address to the Hoover Commission on 
Home Building and Ownership. 
107 Eisenhower Commission at 31. 
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loosely-organized, why no opportunities exist to become 
un-poor, why students feel alienated from the rest of 
society, or why the hopes of the new young breed of 
inmates had been frustrated, the commissions engage in a 
kind of disguised blame. The actors themselves may be 
faultless but they are, nevertheless, the source of the 
"problem." It would be unjust to condemn them, and yet it 
seems obvious that they are what needs to be changed if 
social crisis is to be averted in the future. 
This tendency to place a disguised blame 
becomes more apparent when the commissions venture into 
social psychology. The actors not only fail to adjust to the 
circumstantial facts of racism, exploitation, or injustice, but 
they can not tolerate their own subjective feelings of 
racism, exploitation, and injustice. According to the 
Scranton Commission, "Students' basic ways of seeing the 
world became, during the l 960's, less tolerant of war, of 
racism, and of the things these entail ... They feel that 
government, the university, and other American institu_tions 
have not responded ... " 108 The Attica Commission 
provided a similar analysis: "The Attica rebels were part of 
a new breed of younger, more aware inmates, who came to 
prison full of deep feelings of alienation and hostility 
against the established institutions of law and govern-
ment." 109 By attempting to be neutral in not suggesting 
whether these feelings are justified, the commissions imply 
that everything would have been all right had these actors 
not felt the way they did. The "problem" becomes isolated 
within the actors' heads; although they are not blamed for 
having such feelings, the feelings and perceptions become 
the loci of the problems, and the objects of efforts at social 
problem solving. 
Furthermore, in looking for the causes of 
particular law breaking, commissions rarely consider 
whether the law being flouted is itself unjust or unenforce-
able. Instead, they inquire into the reasons why the average 
law breaker is driven to act as he does, and they probe his 
background and upbringing. The Wickersham Commission 
emphasized that prohibition was not working because many 
individuals reacted with hostility toward the law and its 
enforcement and "many felt that repression and interfer-
ence with private conduct are carried too far." 110 The 
Shafer Commission on marijuana attempted to discover 
why America's youth had begun ingesting the drug. It 
found the fundamental causes to be their "loss of a vision 
in the future," their "loss of a sense of community," and 
the life style of their medicine and alcohol ingesting 
parents. m Once again, the problem is located in the heads 
of the actors. 
The use of inductive logic tends quite 
conveniently to isolate the problem within the actors 
themselves. Given mounds of raw data about the crisis, the 
social scientist will attempt to locate factors which are both 
necessary and sufficient explanations of the crisis. If factors 
A, B, C, and D for example, were all present when the crisis 
occurred, but A, B, and C have also existed elsewhere and 
produced no such crisis, while factor D tends to be present 
whenever crisis occurs, Dis singled out as the most likely 
necessary and sufficient explanation. Thus racism, police 
brutality, and exploitative landlords and merchants can not 
sufficiently explain the ghetto riots of the mid-l 960's 
because they existed for a long time before rioting 
occurred, and they also existed in many areas where no 
rioting took place. Similarly, intolerable prison conditions 
seem to be an insufficient explanation for Attica, because 
essentially the same conditions existed before and 
elsewhere with no such result. 
The social scientist will seek out those factors 
which are new to the situation and which correlate with the 
crisis. 112 The new factors are likely to be a new political 
awareness or a new experience shared by all of the actors 
involved. These new factors will then be viewed as the "real 
causes" of the crisis. They will explain why the crisis 
happened where it did and not elsewhere, and why it 
happened when it did and not before. 
The process of discovering necessary and 
sufficient explanations will inevitably point up what was 
new about an otherwise unchanged situation; the status quo 
will be disregarded, even though it may fairly be judged as 
intolerable. What will be emphasized as the "real cause" of 
the crisis will likely be something peculiar to the actors' 
perceptions, for the actors' perceptions are almost certainly 
new. Thus, the Scranton Commission reasoned: 
Since war and racism ary not new to American 
society ... the emergence on campus of these 
issues as objects of increasingly widespread 
student protest can only have been the result of 
some further cause, a change in some factor 
that intervened between the conditions (war, 
racism) in the country and their emergence as 
issues that led to student protest. 113 
108 Scranton Commission at 59. 
109 McKay Commission at 105. 
110 Wickersham Report on Prohibition at 
77-78. 
111 Shafer Commission at 42. 
112 See Jones and Davis, From Acts to 
Dispositions, in Experimental 
Advances in Social Psychology vol 2 at 
219 (L. Berkowitz, ed. 1965). 
113 Scranton Commission at 60. 
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A pragmatic solution is one to which politi-
cians, administrators, and corporate executives who would 
be responsible for making any changes that did occur, could 
potentially agree. It is here that commissions find 
themselves in a dilemma. For it is often these same 
politicians, administrators, and executives who are at least 
in part responsible for the crisis having occurred in the first 
place. To indict them for having contributed to the crisis 
would be likely to negate any support which they might 
provide for the action program. The most pragmatic 
strategy is to underplay their responsibility for the crisis. 
And yet, in doing this, commissions provide the politician, 
administrator, or executive with an easy excuse for not 
acting on the recommendations: Why should I act? he 
might say, after all, I'm not responsible. 
This ambiguity expresses itself both when the 
commission is identifying the causes of the crisis and when 
it makes its recommendations. Even the McKay Attica 
Commission, which produced one of the most pointedly 
frank reports of the entire group, condemned Governor 
Rockefeller's decision not to come to Attica in carefully 
modulated phrases: "Recognizing the decision was not an 
easy one for the Governor to make, the Commission 
nevertheless believes that conditions made it appropriate 
for the Governor to go to Attica." 129 The recommen-
dations for action are seldom if ever directed to specific 
institutions and individuals. The Attica Commission 
recommended that correction personnel be trained to 
understand and deal with the "new breed" of inmates, and 
to understand and control the racism in themselves, but the 
Commission neglected to place responsibility for carrying 
out the recommendation on any individual or agency. 130 
A modest program is also necessary if it is to 
gain moral force. Moral force depends upon the legitimacy 
of widespread consensus. The appeal must be to those 
values that America already accepts. The exhortation is, 
after all, a ritual in which all of America is to take part. A 
high level of generality and homily in the program make it a 
perfect vehicle for moral uplifting. 
Exhortation is addressed to all of America; 
responsibility for acting on the program is widespread and 
diffuse. ''The major need is to generate new will," preached 
the Eisenhower Violence Commission, "the will to tax 
ourselves to the extent necessary to meet the vital needs of 
the nation." 131 Few could disagree with this sentiment. 
Exhortation is addressed to an America that seems to have 
a single will and a single voice. The Attica Commission 
pronounced that "no excuse can justify the failure of the 
American people to demand a better system of criminal 
justice ... Time is running out, particularly when we know 
better than we do." 132 The Kerner Commission urged 
America to "tackle the major unfinished business of this 
nation." 133 And the Katzenbach Crime Commission 
insisted that "America must translate its well founded 
alarm about crime into social action that will prevent 
crime." 134 
A part of the exhortation is saved for the actors 
who participated in the crisis. While their acts are under-
standable, they are not to be condoned. "The holding of 
human lives for ransom is wrong and only leads to more 
violence"; 135 "violence can not built a better soci-
ety ... "; 136 "Universities should be rededicated to the 
central purposes of teaching and scholarship." 137 "All 
history teaches us that as a conscious method of social 
reform, violence is a dangerous method to employ. That is 
why our nation has sought to avoid violent methods of 
social change." 138 The Vietnam War was raging at its most 
furious level when this last statement was drafted. 
Violence is not all that is condemned. Although 
the Shafer Commission found no evidence linking the 
smoking of marijuana to crime, ill health, or road accidents, 
it condemned marijuana use as "irresponsible" when it 
"impedes the individual's integration into the economic and 
social system." 139 Years before, the Wickersham Commis-
sion had espoused a similar rationale for prohibition: the 
law should remain and be observed, said the Commission, 
because with it the nation can experience increased 
productivity, increased efficiency, and the elimination of 
"blue Mondays." 140 
The major premises are left out of all these 
exhortations: that there is no cause in present day America 
which would justify violence, and that economic productiv-
. ity and integration into the social and economic system are 
valid ends in themselves. 
129 McKay Commission at 324. 132 McKay Commission at xv. 
130 McKay Commission at xvi-xviii. 
131 Eisenhower Commission at xxix. 
133 Kerner Commission at 410. 
134 Katzenbach Commission at 15. 
135 McKay Commission at 106. 
136 Kerner Commission at 11-14. 
137 Scranton Commission at 13. 
138 Eisenhower Commission at 97. 
139 Shafer Commission at 128. 
140 Wickersham Report on Enforcement of 
Prohibition Lows, at 128-230. 
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The specific proposals underlying the large 
moral exhortations are so modest that they hardly seem to 
merit the weighty righteousness of the prose that surrounds 
them. The Violence Commission urged America to 
"reconstruct its urban life" 141 but it called merely for the 
18-year old vote, an expansion of legal services, draft 
reform, programs for ghetto youth, and injunctions against 
interference with First Amendment Rights. 142 The 
Scranton Commission pronoun~ed that America "must 
establish respect for the processes of law and tolerance for 
the exercise of dissent," 143 but recommended merely that 
the President meet with students, that state and local 
officials make more careful plans for handling campus 
disorders, that more federal aid be given to black colleges, 
that National Guardsmen be better trained, and that 
university administrators make clear the limits of permis-
sible conduct on their campuses. 144 
A basic recommendation running through all 
commission reports is that more federal funds be spent on 
"the problem." While most Americans are likely to resist 
paying more taxes, the sentiment that they after all should 
pay more taxes for solving the nation's social ills is a 
sentiment to which almost all can agree; it is a moral 
sentiment, somewhat akin to the rightness of making 
charitable contributions. More to the point, it has nothing 
to do with redistributing America's power or wealth. 
Moreover, according to several commissions, most of the 
funds that are needed can come painlessly from "reordering 
priorities." Thus the Eisenhower Violence Commission 
estimated that about $20 billion would be necessary to cure 
the problems it identified, but it reasoned that the entire 
sum would automatically be available when the Vietnam 
War ended. 145 
A final theme in the proposed solution is that 
America's institutions must become "humanized" and 
"more responsive." This is .the Scranton Commission's basic 
prescription for the universities, and the Attica Commis-
sion's basic proposal for the nation's prisons. Within all 
commission reports there is a great deal of talk about the 
necessity that administrators, guards, the police, and other 
enforcement personnel become more "sensitive" and 
"understanding." The assumption underlying these 
proposals is, that if people could only communicate with 
each other, if they could truly understand each other's 
motives and ambitions, th~n most crises could be averted. 
Bitterness, hostility, violence, and disorder are seen 
essentially as irrational responses to misinformation and 
Here, perhaps, lies the most vital aspect of the 
ritual of reaffirmation: the assertion that there is always a 
peaceful, positive solution to every social conflict which is 
in the best interests of all participants; that there are no 
irreconcilable conflicts between Americans: between labor 
and management, wets and drys, rich and poor, black and 
white, students and university administrators, marijuana 
users and those appalled by marijuana use, prisoners and 
their captors. The ritual of reaffirmation assumes rational 
compromise. 
With all the verbiage about reconciliation, it 
seems somewhat ironic that the commissions' most specific 
recommendations have to do with tactics for using force 
most effectively to control disorder. While the commis-
sions' recommendations for positive social change are 
addressed broadly to all of America and made to depend 
upon the national will rather than on elected officials, this 
is not true of the recommendations for controlling disorder. 
These latter recommendations are addressed directly to the 
officials involved. The commissions recommend that 
authorities move in quickly to end disorder, 146 and 
specific methods of riot control are suggested. 147 The 
Eisenhower Violence Commission included among its 
recommendations the draconian suggestion that 
we devise means of identification of specific 
violence-prone individuals for analysis and 
treatment in order to reduce the likelihood of 
repetition; provision of special schools for the 
education of young people with violence-prone 
histories; special psychiatric services and 
employment programs for parolees and released 
offenders with a history of violent criminal 
acts. 148 
The necessity for programs both "doable" and 
morally uplifting creates, quite understandably, a gulf 
between what are perceived to be the causes of the crisis 
and the solutions which are offered for dealing with them. 
The gulf between causes and solutions is mirrored on the 
commission staff by tensions between social scientists and 
lawyers. 
141 Eisenhower Commission at 271-282. 
142 .Id. 
146 E.g., see Eisenhower Commission at 
4l;McKay Commission at 213; 
McCone Commission at 17, 19. 143 Scranton Commission at 8. 
144 Id. at 8-15. 
145 Eisenhower Commission at xxv, xxix. 
147 See, e.g., Kerner Commission, 
Supplement on Control of Disorder, at 
484. . 
148 Eisenhower Commission at 273. 
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Obviously, the Commission found the "real cause" to be 
lodged in the perceptions of the students: 
Clearly, whatever it is that transforms a 
condition into an issue lies in the eyes of the 
beholder-or, more precisely, in his opinions 
and perceptions. The emergence of these issues 
was caused by a change in opinions, percep-
tions, and values-that is, by a change in the 
culture of students. 114 
The Scranton Commission thereby implies that the 
"problem" of campus unrest was located in the student 
culture, not within the conditions of racism and the 
Vietnam War. 
Social scientists will naturally attempt to limit 
and isolate those intervening variables that provide a 
sufficient explanation for the crisis. But it should not be 
inferred from this that the intervening variables are in any 
way more important than the conditions that surround 
them, or more worthy of social concern. Nor should it be 
inferred that the new factors which have been isolated, such 
as the student culture, are somehow abnormal or extraor-
dinary. On the contrary, the fact that intolerable social 
conditions have existed without producing such anger, 
frustration, and alienation might be thought to be more 
surprising. And yet, by suggesting that the opinions and 
perceptions that exist within the actors are the "real cause" 
for the crisis, and that America would have gone on much 
as it always had "but for" such perceptions, the commis-
sions appear to be placing responsibility for the crises 
squarely on "the eyes of the beholder." It is a short step to 
the idea that what needs to be done is to change these 
perceptions. 
Occasionally a commission will make a 
superficial attempt at broadening responsibility, such as the 
Kerner Commission's famous indictment of ''white racism". 
The Commission solemnly announced that "White racism is 
essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has 
been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War 
IL" 115 The Commission saw the "fruits" of that racism as 
discrimination in education, housing, and employment, all 
resulting in social disorganization within the ghetto: 
"Segregation and poverty have intersected to destroy 
opportunity and hope." 116 This explosive mixture was 
catalyzed in recent years by three "ingredients" -frustrated 
hopes, an ethos of legitimized violence, and powerlessness. 
Finally, to this was added the fatal "spark" of incitement 
·by extremists and police brutality. 117 
The Kerner Commission presented America 
with a recipe to which everyone could agree because it 
made all white citizens responsible, and in so doing made 
no one responsible. The huge social force called "white 
racism" was as all-embracing as it was vague. It permitted 
America to condemn itself and then get on with its normal 
business. It suggested an irrational feeling on the part of 
most Americans which could only be rectified by a basic 
change in attitudes; it suggested that teachers and preachers 
had a much greater role to play than politicians. 
Such a broadening of responsibility is not really 
a broadening at all, because it ignores those specific 
individuals and institutions in America, such as labor unions 
and land speculators, for whom racism means significant 
benefits. And it fails to condemn those acts which sustain 
and perpetuate racist policies within political units, within 
institutions that deliver social services, and within private 
organizations. White racism, left as it was without 
definition, separates an attitude from the specific self-
interested acts which give that attitude concreteness and 
make it fundamentally blameworthy. 
Placing responsibility upon an attitude 
embraced by all of white society is merely another way of 
isolating and sanitizing the problem. It implies that feelings 
and perceptions need to be changed, rather than institu-
tions and power relationships. 
The process of isolating the problem and 
making it as elusive and unthreatening as a perception or an 
attitude is crucial to the goal of reaffirmation. Without it, 
every institution in America would be suspect; with it, 
America's way of perceiving itself is preserved. Social crises 
challenge America's faith in its institutions and, more 
fundamentally, in its way of viewing those institutions. 
Crisis commissions contribute to restoring that faith. 
Commission reports virtually ring with confidence about 
America's basic institutional strengths. The Commission on 
Industrial Relations assured America in 1914 that "labor 
114 Id. at 61. 
115 Kerner Commission at 10. 
116 Id. at 10-11. 
117 Id.atll. 
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desires what we all want-a job, a decent place to live, 
••• " 
118 Hoover's Commission on Economic Trends assured 
America in 1929 that "the bogy of overproduction is 
illusory." 119 The Kerner Commission assured America that 
"Negro protest has been firmly rooted in he basic values of 
American society, seeking not their destruction, but their 
fulfillment." 120 The Scranton Commission assured 
America that ''we are a nation of enduring strength. 
Millions of Americans-generations past and present-have 
given their vision, their energy, and their patient labor to 
make us a more just nation and a more humane peo-
ple." 121 The Eisenhower Violence Commission reassured 
America that, despite violence in its cities and on its 
campuses, "America will prevail." 122 
Any commission report that violates the ritual 
of reaffirmation is suppressed and its report withheld from 
the public. Mayor LaGuardia's Commission on Conditions 
in Harlem, created in response to the Harlem riots of 1935, 
produced a report entitled The Negro in Harlem-a Report 
on Social and Economic Conditions. The report, issued 
under the direction of E. Franklin Frazier, then Professor 
of Sociology at Howard University, traced as causes of the 
rioting the racial discrimination in the Independent Subway 
System, the civil service, and labor unions. It also placed 
responsibility on New York City real tors and developers for 
creating a Negro Ghetto: "Crowded in a ghetto, the negro 
· tenant is forced to pay exorbitant rentals." 123 The report 
: criticized city health agencies for not providing systematic 
and comprehensive health care to Harlem residents, it 
criticized the city housing administration for inadequate 
enforcement of the city housing code, and it chided the 
city for awarding contracts to private firms that discrimi· 
nated in employment. The report was never released. Its 
fmdings were impounded by the City Council, and a news 
blackout, voluntarily agreed to by every major New York 
paper, assured that no one would ever miss it. 124 
A similar fate befell one subcommittee of the 
Kerner Commission. Entitled The Harvest of Racism, the 
report of the subcommittee determined that many riots 
were motivated not by a desire to achieve the American 
ideal, but rather by a revolutionary goal "attached to the 
distribution of power in the whole system." 125 The report 
suggested that riots were important political acts, useful in 
gaining public attention and building black awareness. The 
report was rejected by the Commission. Research Director 
Robert Shellow, who produced the document, was 
dismissed, along with his staff of four assistants. 125 
They had been fulfilling their duty to the forest 
by rejoicing with the molimo for the long and 
good life that had been granted the old lady. 
They had acknowledged the gift of fire of life 
from the forest, and the forest's right and 
power to withdraw it. 127 
The task of identifying and isolating a problem 
as the "real cause" of the crisis fulfills only a part of the 
goal of reaffirmation. America needs to know, in addition, 
that the problem can be solved, that a solution is available, 
and that the solution does not entail any radical change in 
the way America perceives social life. This calls for the 
development of a program for action by the commission. 
The commission is called upon to employ advocacy and 
exhortation. The exhortation is fundamentally moralistic, 
because the program is based upon principles to which all 
of America can agree. 
The program for action does not follow 
inevitably from the description of the problem. The "real 
cause" of the crisis could suggest many different possible 
ways of dealing with it, but there is only one program. 
Although it is not thought to be beyond the "competence" 
of the commission to fmd explanations for the crisis within 
the great social forces of our age-white racism, the youth 
culture, migrations in to the city, the breakdown of the 
family-it is considered to be beyond the competence of 
the commission to recommend a program that would meet 
these social forces head on. Instead, the program for action 
is a far more modest one. 
There are other reasons for modesty. The 
program must be one that is "doable"; that is, the solution 
must be within the realm of practical political change if it is 
to restore confidence. "One of the few things that Bill 
Scranton insisted on," said one member of the Scranton 
Commission, ''was that all of the things we recommended 
be doable by the people to whom they were recom-
mended." 128 A program that appears quixotic and 
politically naive will not reaffirm the nation's ability to 
solve its problems. 
118 Report, supra, note 7. 
119 Report supra, note 32. 
127 Turnbull, supra note 73, at 154. 
128 Interview, February 14, 1973, name 
Withheld. 120 Kerner Commission at 281 et. seq. 
121 Scranton Commission at 15. 
122 Eisenhower Commission at 261. 
123 The Negro in Harlem ... (N.Y. 
Municipal Archives, unpub) 
124 Locke, Dark Weather vane, 25 Survey 
Graphic 457 (August 1936). 
125 See Kopkind, supra note 100. 
126 Id. 
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Lawyers are tempted to systemize reality and 
place it into neat categories; reality for them tends to be 
quickly transformed into supporting evidence for particular 
programs which they wish to advocate. They are generally 
practical salesmen, yearners after the concrete. They work 
quickly and well under the pressure of inevitable deadlines, 
and they normally have a well developed political 
sensibility. 
In contrast, social scientists tend to shun the 
easy c;~egories and sharp distinctions. Their reality is 
usually.Jar more subtle and variable. They do not generally 
perceive themselves as advocates of particular positions, but 
more often as dispassionate truth seekers. They do not 
work hastily, they are apt to function poorly under 
pressure, and their political sensibilities normally lean 
toward the naive. 
That conflict should exist between social 
scientists and lawyers on crisis commissions hardly seems 
surprising. Lawyers normally occupy the upper ranks of 
commission staffs. The executive director of the commis-
sion, whose job it is to coordinate the staff and supply the 
commissioners with summaries of evidence and draft . 
position papers, normally is recruited from a large law firm. 
He in turn hires lawyers to assist him, usually recruited 
from the sprawling network of young lawyers who flow 
between the federal agencies, Congressional committees, 
and associate positions in the firms. 
Social scientists fill the lower ranks of the 
commission staffs. They are hired by lawyers, and are often 
viewed by lawyers as "technicians" and "hired hands" 
whose job it is to fill in the footnotes and examples for the 
lawyers' "briefs." Regardless of what evidence the social 
scientists come up with, it is the lawyers who decide what 
materials will appear in the drafts submitted to the 
commissioners. "We always knew what we wanted better 
than the social scientists," said one young lawyer on the 
Scranton Commission staff. "We would go to them because 
we didn't have the time to do the work ourselves." 149 
Often the lawyers become impatient with the "ineffici-
ency" of the social scientists. Thomas Sheridan, executive 
director of the McCone Commission examining the Watts 
riot, complained that "a lot of material was coming in ... 
but it wasn't in the practical world. And we wanted hard 
facts." 150 
Crisis commission lawyers often feel that they 
must produce defensible conclusions and programs in a 
relatively short span of time. They sense the political 
factors at work-the need to produce their final recommen-
dations while the crisis is still fresh in politicians' minds. 
The Kerner Commission produced its report within eight 
months, in order to be considered in Johnson's budget 
message. 151 The Eisenhower Violence Commission issued 
its first report within the first four months of its existence. 
And the Scranton Commission came out with its initial 
recommendations within three months of being convened. 
"We have to work urgently," said Matthew Byrne, the 
executive director of the Scranton Commission. ''The 
troops are out of Cambodia and the kids are out of school, 
but the crisis is going to be there all over again in the 
fall." 152 
The press for quick results creates a tendency 
to vindicate initial assumptions. The Kerner Commission, 
for example, took the testimony of several black militants 
after the chapters of the report dealing with black militancy 
had already been approved in final form. 153 Crisis 
commissions are, quite obviously, the arbiters of their own 
procedures: they contain no critical review mechanism, no 
cross examination, no position of "devil's advocate." 
According to James Short, director of research for the 
Eisenhower Violence Commission, ''The social scientists 
find themselves ... in a position of having to argue for a 
systematic, objective view, looking at alternative hypoth-
eses and bringing the weight of evidence upon alterna-
tives." 154 Despite the care of social scientists, shoddy 
workmanship may slip by. For example, the Lockhart 
pornography commission cited, in support' of its proposal 
to liberalize obscenity laws, a survey that it had conducted 
·which asked a random sample of people to spontaneously 
mention what they considered to be the most crucial 
problem then facing America. Since only two per cent of 
the sample spontaneously mentioned pornography, the 
Commission concluded that Americans do not regard 
pornography as a serious social problem. 155 
The conflict between documenting complex 
facts and advocating relatively simple and modest solutions 
also challenges the crisis commissions' symbolic legitimacy 
and authority. They are meant to be objective, above 
politics. And yet, in advocating particular programs which 
are not necessarily supported by the facts they recount, the 
commissions begin to resemble any other lobby group in 
Washington. Moreover, in picking and choosing their facts 
as support for their programs, they make themselves 
vulnerable to political attack. Finally, in seeking a moral 
consensus, they expose themselves to any other groups 
which claim a contrary consensus. 
149 Cited by Etzioni, Wall St. Journal, July 
9, 1968 at 1, col. 3. 
ISO Cited by Jacobs, Prelude to Riot: A 
View of Urban America from the 
Bottom at 238 (1966). 
IS 1 Hearings, Testimony of Otto Kerner, 
May 25, 1970~ . 
152 N.Y. Times, Sept 27, 1970 at 1, col. 8. 
1S3 Jacobs, supra note 152: 
1S4 Cited in Friedman, Dialogue with 
James Short, 5 Issues in Criminology 
no 1, Winter 1970, at 30. 
ISS Lockhart Commission at 187-188. 
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The old woman had returned, alone. All the 
others were in their huts, and the men seemed 
to be singing as though by their song they 
could drive the last remaining female away. 
They sang louder and louder, but she kept 
circling the kumamolimo, keeping in the 
shadows, until with surprisingly swift and agile 
strides she was once more in our midst. 156 
Both the factual explanations for why the crisis 
occurred and the recommended program for dealing with it 
come ultimately from the commissioners themselves. The 
commissioners personify American success by way of 
personal achievement: they have made it; they are 
individually prominent and venerable, untarnished by 
political ambition and above aggressive careerism. A survey 
of nine major commissions between 1917 and 1970 reveals 
that 97 per cent of the commissioners on them were male 
and 57 per cent were lawyers, with an average age of 54.3 
years and an average skin pigmentation of lily white. 157 
Commissioners are drawn from a relatively 
small elite. They are perhaps the closest thing we have in 
America to a Disraelian aristocracy. Twenty per cent of the 
commissioners on any major commission either have served 
before on another commission or will serve again on a 
future one. The rosters of commission members carry 
familiar names: Henry Rowan, President of RAND; J. Irwin 
Miller, Chairman of the Board of Cummins Engine; Thomas 
J. Watson of IBM; Clifford Alexander of A & P; Kermit 
. Gordon of the Brookings Institute; Charles Thornton of 
: Litton Industries; Dean Bayless Manning; of Stanford Law 
School; Crawford Greenewalt of E. I. Dupont; and 
Kingman Brewster of Yale. Commissioners are not meant to 
represent America; rather, they are meant to stand above 
America and guide it, as they do in real life. 
Neither are the "minority" members of 
commissions thought to represent minorities. They 
are, rather. the elites of their minorities: Roy Wilkins, 
Whitney Young, Ed Brooke, and John Johnson, publisher 
of Ebony; Mary Bunting, president of Radcliffe; George 
Meany, Walter Reuther, and I.W. Abel; Joseph Rhodes. 
A curious kind of pluralism determines the mix 
of commissioners. Commissioners are, after all, thought to 
be above partisanship. And yet, it seems important to 
insure non partisanship by harnessing the elites of every 
organized segment of American opinion. ''The distinctive 
virtue of the government commission," writes Daniel Bell, 
"is that there is a specific effort to involve the full range of 
elite in order to see if a real consensus can be achieved." 1511 
But conducting a commission by way of 
consensus has a political flavor of logrolling and bargaining 
which seems at sharp odds with he dispassionate seeking 
after truth supposed to characterize commissions. The 
identification of the "problem" and the presentation of the 
solution to it imply a process of discovery, not a process of 
compromise. And yet, according to Henry Ruth of the 
Katzenbach Crime Commission, "It is difficult to convey 
the bustling atmosphere that proceeds the development of 
consensus-the frustrations, the in-fighting, the evolution of 
a reconciliation of polarized views." 159 
The process of coming up with authoritative 
answers by way of consensus produces some odd results. 
For example, the strong summary language of the Kerner 
Commission report was written by Mayor Lindsay's staff, 
who felt that the rest of the report was not sufficiently 
hard-hitting. Lindsay merely threatened to issue it as a 
minori~ dissent unless the Commission adopted it as their 
own. 1 A second example comes from the Warren 
Commission: three commissioners felt that there was 
"compelling" evidence that Kennedy and Connally had 
been hit by the same bullet; three others felt that the 
evidence was just barely "credible." The Commission was 
deadlocked until consensus was reached by reporting that 
the evidence of one bullet was merely "persuasive." 161 
Sometimes, of course, consensus breaks down. 
The Eisenhower Violence Commission split 7 to 6 on the 
"truth" of whether non-violent civil disobedience 
necessarily destroys respect for the law and leads to other 
forms of lawlessness. 162 The Lockhart pornography 
commission was racked by the dissents of commissioners 
Charles Keating, founder of Citizens for Decent Literature, 
the Rev. Morton Hill, president of Morality in Media, and 
the Rev. Winfred Link, administrator of the McKendreee 
Manor Methodist Retirement Home in Hermitage, 
Tennessee. They called the report a "Magna Carta for the 
pornographer." 163 
156 Turnbull, supra note 73, at 155. 162 Eisenhower Commission at 89. 
157 A. Platt, The Politics of Riot Commis-
sions at 12 (1971). 
158 Bell, Government by Commission, The 
Public Interest Spring 1966, at 34. 
159 Ruth, To Dust Shall Ye Return? 43 
Notre Dame Lawyer 827 (1968). 
· 160 Lipsky and Olson, Riot Commission 
Politics, Trans-Action, July-August 
1969,at 18. 
161 Epstein, Invitation to Inquest, at 65 
(1965). 
163 Lockhart Commission at 458 et. seq. 
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Why must crisis commissioners engage in 
pluralist bargaining? Why are dissenting reports 
thought to be such serious blows to the credibility of 
majority reports? British royal commissions often issue 
separate reports of their dissenting members, and the 
dissents do not undermine the effectiveness of the majority 
reports; if anything, the majority reports thereby become 
more credible. But unanimity and consensus is crucial to 
the central purpose of American crisis commissions, which 
is to reassure rather than to plan. 
Social psychologists tell us that there are two 
primary means by which each of us forms new conclusions 
about reality. 164 The first means is by discovering a new 
frame of reference or a new way of viewing reality that 
explains our perceptions more simply and consistently than 
any we have had previously. The new frame of reference 
might be a new kind of discrimination, or a comparison, or 
a new mode of analysis that we had never before employed. 
The second means by which we form new conclusions 
about reality is by way of other peoples' perceptions. We 
are simply swayed by consensus; we use other peoples' 
perceptions to judge the accuracy of our own. 
Our conclusions about reality are constantly 
being altered both by new frames of reference and by new 
consensus. If, for example, we observe some object in the 
sky that looks like a flying saucer, we might check out our 
conclusion by consulting with others who may have seen it, 
as well as by observing pictures of illuminated marsh gas or 
other phenomena that could provide a more accurate and 
consistent frame of reference. 
Our willingness to rely upon consensus as a 
source for our conclusions about reality will depend upon 
the trustworthiness of those who make up the consensus. 
Our confidence about a conclusion based on consensus will 
depend upon our assessment of the integrity, ability, and 
disinterestedness of those on whom we rely. In contrast, 
our reliance upon a frame or reference does not depend 
upon its source; the frame of reference, if it is a good one, 
stands on its own as a simpler and more consistent way of 
making sense out of our perceptions than any framework 
we used previously. 
Crisis commissions could attempt to provide 
America with new frames of reference for understanding 
the reality of social crisis. Crisis commissions could offer 
America explanations for crisis and means for dealing with 
crisis that are in and of themselves compelling because they 
clarify and make sense out of much that was before 
ambiguous. To the extent that commissions did this, they 
would not need to be concerned with "selling" their 
findings, resorting to exhortation, or arriving at a consensus 
among commissioners. But to the extent that crisis 
commissions aim to shape America's conclusions about 
social reality by the sheer weight of the commissions' own 
perceptions of that reality, they are forced to rely upon the 
status, prestige, and integrity of their commissioners. 
Unanimity among them then becomes crucial, for a sign of 
disharmony may give rise to doubts about their wisdom and 
integrity. 
Since the central function of crisis commissions 
is not to change America's perceptions of social reality but, 
on the contrary, to reassure America that its old ways of 
perceiving need not be altered, crisis commissions do not 
provide new frames of reference. The processes of isolating 
and sanitizing social problems, and providing neat and 
"doable" solutions for them, simply reinforces old frames 
of reference and old modes of analysis. In fact, crisis 
commissions impare the development of new frames of 
reference which might otherwise follow from crises which 
shake America's confidence in its old ways of perceiving 
social reality. The dominant technique that is used to 
preserve these old frames of reference is, of course, 
consensus. 
Thus the status, prestige, and disinterestedness 
of commissioners is crucial to the commission's task of 
reassuring America that social crisis can be understood and 
dealt with without any radical change in how America 
views itself. Once this fundamental reaffirmation has been 
achieved, the final stage of the ritual may begin. 
The old woman solemnly went among us again, 
untying each man. Nobody attempted to loose 
himself, but as each man was untied he began 
to sing once more-the molimo was free. 165 
''The reports of commissions," warned The 
Nation in its editorial of March, 1900, "are seldom 
accepted as conclusive, either by legislators or by the 
people at large." 166 Crisis commission reports are issued 
amid a great deal of public fanfare: commissioners appear 
on television panels, the reports' recommendations are 
featured in magazines and newspapers, the commissions' 
findings are made available in cheap paperback editions, 
frequently with fifty or more pages of photographs. But the 
most interesting aspect of the reports' issuance is that 
everyone of any notoriety who reads the reports feels called 
upon to agree or disagree with them. The reports are viewed 
164 See H. Kelley, Attribution Theory in 
Social Psychology in 1967 Nebraska 
Symposium on Motivation 192 (1967); 
see also Kelley, Moral Evaluation, 26 
American Psychologist 293 (1971). 
165 Turnbull, supra note 73, at 155. 
166 The Nation, vol 70, no. 1814, at 255 
(April, 1900). 
17
Reich: Solving Social Crises by Commissions
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1973
271 
as polemics about which every editorial writer, news 
commentator, politician, and citizen group is expected to 
have an opinion. 
The report of the Scranton Commission 
provoked sixty six House Republicans to resolve that the 
Commission had failed to place enough blame for campus 
unrest on "spine-less college administrators." 1 ~7 They 
called the report "erroneous and unfound." One 
university president claimed that the report was "calculated 
to please the violence prone." 1611 Another said that the 
Commission had simply placed "too much emphasis on the 
Vietnam War." 169 
The report of the Lockhart pornography 
commission produced a similar storm. The Senate voted 
sixty to five in favor of rejecting it. Thirty four Republican 
Senators urged Nixon to disavow it. l"10 And Billy Graham 
called it "one of the worst, most diabolical reports ever 
made by a Presidential commission." 171 
Indeed, every commission report has produced 
a storm of criticism. Many have, in addition, provoked 
"counter commissions." The McCone Commissions' 
analysis of the Watts riot prompted the California Advisory 
Commission of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to 
issue its own report. 172 The Kerner Commission's report 
moved the Senate to authorize MeClellan's subcommittee 
"to make a full and complete study and investigation of 
riots." 173 The Scranton Commission's report provoked the 
College Young Republicans to form a Free Campus 
Commission to study campus disorder from the viewpoint 
of the "silent majority." 174 And the report of the McKay 
Attica Commission elicited a contrasting report from New 
York's Commissioner of Corrections. 175 
It might at first seem curious that reports which 
are supposedly based on hard facts and the "inexorable 
march of logic" should be viewed as polemics. But the hard 
facts and social science which is applied to them merely 
form a backdrop for the important consensus of the 
commissioners about why the crisis occurred and what 
should be done about it. The conclusions of the commis-
sion are understood to be the ''views" of its commissioners. 
As such, they can be agreed with or disagreed with. They 
invite participation; they provoke debate. 
By reducing social crisis to controllable and 
comfortable proportions, crisis commissions perform the 
important feat of defusing substantial threats to America's 
perceptions about itself. Once reassured that no fundamen-
tal changes are demanded in frames of reference, America 
feels free to reassert its normal range of argument. The 
social crisis is de-mythologized to the point where everyone 
once again is confident about dealing with it and having an 
opinion about it. The parameters of the old debates are 
familiar and comfortable. The social crisis enters the 
cocktail party. 
What is rarely if ever challenged in this final 
stage of the ritual is the crisis commission's fundamental 
reassurance that the social crisis can be understood and can 
be dealt with within the old perceptual framework. For it is 
this fundamental reaffirmation that permits debate. 
Without it, America would not know where to begin the 
polemic. 
The crisis commission does not enter the fray. 
Once its report is issued, it disbands. Its executive director 
goes back to his law firm; its young lawyers go back to their 
government agencies and Congressional committees; its 
social scientists and consultants go off to seek further 
research grants; and its commissioners go back to their 
executive positions. The commission's task is over. Having 
restored the boundaries for rational debate and reassured 
America that those boundaries are sound, any further 
existence for the crisis commission would be superfluous. 
Social crises do, of course, ultimately give rise 
to new ways of perceiving !)ocial reality. We no longer view 
the struggle of the labor movement during the first two 
decades of this century as motivated by the "frustration of 
unemployment" as did Taft's Industrial Relations 
Commission. Nor do we view prohibition as a "noble 
experiment" which, according to Hoover's Wickersham 
Commission, contributed to American productivity. And 
President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals, 
which declared in 1960 that "At whatever cost, we must 
maintain strategic and tactical forces of sufficient strength 
to deter the communist powers and to cope with military 
aggression even on a limited scale," 176 seems now to 
comprise a tragic and distorted framework for viewing 
reality. 
But the transition to new frameworks for 
viewing social reality is a painful one; it causes fear and 
confusion; it discourages action. Crisis commissions ease 
that transition. They make social crises seem controllable 
and understandable within a rational framework that is 
comfortably familiar. It is, no doubt, an unfortunate ritual, 
but perhaps a necessary one. 
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